

## CURRICULUM VITAE

### Timothy Williamson

Position: Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford and Fellow of New College Oxford

Born: Uppsala, Sweden, 6 August 1955

Nationality: British

Address: New College, Oxford OX1 3BN, U.K.

E-mail: timothyDOTwilliamsonATphilosophyDOToxDOTacDOTuk

#### Positions held

1980-88 Lecturer in Philosophy, Trinity College, Dublin.

1988-94 Fellow and Praelector in Philosophy, University College, Oxford; C.U.F. Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Oxford.

1995-2000 Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, University of Edinburgh.

2000- Wykeham Professor of Logic, University of Oxford, and Fellow of New College Oxford

1990, 1995 Visiting Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, A.N.U.

1994 Visiting Professor, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, M.I.T.

1995 Visiting Erskine Fellow, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Canterbury.

1998-99 Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University.

2004 Visiting scholar, Centre for Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters.

## Distinctions

Fellow of the British Academy (elected 1997)  
 Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (elected 1997)  
 Foreign member of the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters (elected 2004)  
 Foreign honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (elected 2007)

Named lectures:

Henriette Hertz Lecture, British Academy, 1996;  
 Weatherhead Lecture in Philosophy of Language, Tulane University, 1998;  
 Jacobsen Lecture, University of London, 2001;  
 Skolem Lecture, University of Oslo, 2004;  
 Blackwell Brown Lectures, Brown University, 2005;  
 Jack Smart Lecture, Australian National University, 2005;  
 Anders Wedberg Lectures, University of Stockholm, 2006;  
 Gaos Lectures, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Mexico City, 2006;  
 Carl G. Hempel Lectures, Princeton University, 2006;  
 Amherst Lecture, Amherst College, 2009.

Nelson Distinguished Professor, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2003.  
 Townsend Visitor, University of California, Berkeley, 2006.  
 José Gaos Chair, UNAM, Mexico, 2006.  
 Tang Chun-I Visiting Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007.

President of the Aristotelian Society 2004-5.  
 President of the Mind Association 2006-7; Vice-President 2005-6.  
 Vice-President of the British Logic Colloquium 2007-.

Research Awards

AHRC Research Leave Award 2009  
 Leverhulme Trust Major Research Fellowship 2009-12

## Education

Degrees:

B.A. (Oxon.) 1976;  
 M.A. (Oxon.) 1981;  
 M.A. (Dubl.) *ad eundem gradum* 1986;  
 D.Phil. (Oxon.) 1981.

1972-73 Computer programmer, Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell.  
 1973-76 Read Mathematics and Philosophy, Balliol College, Oxford.  
 1974 Mathematics and Philosophy Honour Moderations, Class I.  
 1976 Mathematics and Philosophy Final Honours, Class I, and Henry Wilde Prize.  
 1976-80 Senior Scholar, Christ Church, Oxford; research for D.Phil. thesis 'The Concept of Approximation to the Truth'.

## Timothy Williamson: Publications

## BOOKS

- (1) *Identity and Discrimination*. Pp. ix + 173. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
- (2) *Vagueness*. Pp. xiii + 325. London and New York: Routledge, 1994. Paperback 1996. Pp. 185-189 and 198-215 reprinted in S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay, eds., *Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008.
- (3) *Knowledge and Its Limits*. Pp. xi + 340. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Paperback (with corrections) 2002.  
Chapter 1 trans. P. Egré as ‘La connaissance est-elle un état d’esprit?’, in J. Dutant and P. Engel (eds.), *Philosophie de la Connaissance*, Paris: Vrin, 2005: 259-303, and in E. Sosa, J. Kim, J. Fantl and M. McGrath, eds., *Epistemology: An Anthology*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 2008: 213-230.
- (4) *The Philosophy of Philosophy*. Pp. xiv + 332. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.
- (5) Contributions to P. Greenough and D. Pritchard, eds., *Williamson on Knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming:
  - ‘Acknowledgements’.
  - ‘Reply to Anthony Brueckner’.
  - ‘Reply to Quassim Cassam’.
  - ‘Reply to Elizabeth Fricker’.
  - ‘Reply to Sanford Goldberg’.
  - ‘Reply to Alvin Goldman’.
  - ‘Reply to John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio’.
  - ‘Reply to Frank Jackson’.
  - ‘Reply to Mark Kaplan’.
  - ‘Reply to Jonathan Kvanvig’.
  - ‘Reply to Ram Neta’.
  - ‘Reply to Stephen Schiffer’.
  - ‘Reply to Ernest Sosa’.
  - ‘Reply to Matthias Steup’.
  - ‘Reply to Neil Tennant’.
  - ‘Reply to Charles Travis’.

## ARTICLES

- (1) 'Intuitionism disproved?', *Analysis* **42**, 4 (1982): 203-207.
- (2) 'The infinite commitment of finite minds', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* **14**, 2 (1984): 235-255.
- (3) 'Argument u prilog Platonizmu' ('An argument for Platonism', translated into Serbian by D. Božin), *Dometi* (Rijeka) **17**, 12 (1984): 43-58.
- (4) 'Converse relations', *The Philosophical Review* **94**, 2 (1985): 249-262.
- (5) 'Antropocentrizam i istina' (predecessor of (9), translated into Serbian by D. Božin with English summary), *Filozofska Istraživanja* (Zagreb) **5**, 3 (1985): 501-515.
- (6) 'Realism and the burden of proof', *Irish Philosophical Journal* **3**, 1 (1986): 42-57.
- (7) 'The contingent *a priori*: has it anything to do with indexicals?', *Analysis* **46**, 3 (1986): 113-117.
- (8) 'Criteria of identity and the Axiom of Choice', *The Journal of Philosophy* **83**, 7 (1986): 380-394.  
Reprinted in H.W. Noonan, ed., *Identity*, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993: 419-433.
- (9) 'Anthropocentrism and truth', *Philosophia* **17**, 1 (1987): 33-53.
- (10) 'Invertible definitions', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* **28**, 2 (1987): 244-258.
- (11) 'On the paradox of knowability', *Mind* **96**, 382 (1987): 256-261.
- (12) 'On knowledge of the unknowable', *Analysis* **47**, 3 (1987): 154-158.
- (13) 'Equivocation and existence', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* **88** (1987/8): 109-127.
- (14) 'Bivalence and subjunctive conditionals', *Synthese* **75**, 3 (1988): 405-421.
- (15) 'Assertion, denial and some cancellation rules in modal logic', *Journal of Philosophical Logic* **17**, 3 (1988): 299-318.
- (16) 'Knowability and constructivism', *The Philosophical Quarterly* **38**, 153 (1988): 422-432.
- (17) 'The contingent *a priori*: a reply', *Analysis* **48**, 4 (1988): 218-221.
- (18) 'First order logics for comparative similarity', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* **29**, 4 (1988): 457-481.
- (19) 'On rigidity and persistence', *Logique et Analyse* 121/2 (1988): 89-91.

- (20) (with David Berman) 'Locke on particles: a reply to Nuchelmans', *Logique et Analyse*, 123/4 (1988): 213-215.
- (21) 'Being and being so', *Acta Analytica* **4** (1989): 93-114.
- (22) 'Kriteriji identiteta: tko ih treba?' ('Criteria of identity: who needs them?'), translated into Croatian by M. Palmović with English summary, *Filozofska Istraživanja* **9**, 4 (1989): 1383-1393.
- (23) 'Two incomplete anti-realist modal epistemic logics', *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* **55**, 1 (1990): 297-314.
- (24) 'Verification, falsification and cancellation in KT', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* **31**, 2 (1990): 286-290.
- (25) 'Necessary identity and necessary existence', in R. Haller and J. Brandl, eds., *Wittgenstein - Towards a Re-Evaluation: Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium*, Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990, vol. I: 168-175.
- (26) 'Fregean directions', *Analysis* **51**, 4 (1991): 194-195.
- (27) 'A relation between namesakes in modal logic', *Bulletin of the Section of Logic* (Polish Academy of Sciences) **20**, 3/4 (1991): 129-137.
- (28) 'On intuitionistic modal epistemic logic' *Journal of Philosophical Logic* **21**, 1 (1992): 63-89.
- (29) 'An alternative rule of disjunction in modal logic', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* **33**, 1 (1992): 89-100.
- (30) 'Inexact knowledge', *Mind* **101**, 402 (1992): 217-42.  
 Reprinted in Serbian translation by M. Andjelković as 'Neegzaktno znanje', *Theoria* (Belgrade) **38**, 4 (1995): 87-114.  
 Reprinted in Bulgarian translation in M. Stoicheva-Pantaleeva, ed., *A Reader in Contemporary Oxford Philosophy* (Sofia: Sofia University Press, 1996).
- (31) 'Vagueness and ignorance', *Aristotelian Society*, sup. **66** (1992): 145-162.  
 Reprinted in R. Keefe and P. Smith, eds., *Vagueness: A Reader*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1997: 265-280.  
 Reprinted in M. Rea, ed., *Metaphysics: Critical Concepts in Philosophy*, London: Routledge, 2007.  
 Reprinted in Serbian translation by M. Andjelković as 'Nejasnost i neznanje', *Theoria* (Belgrade) **38**, 4 (1995): 71-86.  
 To be reprinted in Italian translation in G. Ronzitti, ed., *La Vaghezza* (e-book), Italian Web Site of Philosophy, <http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/index.html>.
- (32) 'Verificationism and non-distributive knowledge', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* **71**, 1 (1993): 78-86.
- (33) 'Some admissible rules in non-normal modal systems', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* **34**, 3, (1993): 378-400.

- (34) ‘The early history of sorites paradoxes’, *Argumento* (Lisbon) **3**, 5/6 (1993): 35-44.
- (35) ‘Non-genuine MacIntosh logics’, *Journal of Philosophical Logic* **23**, 1 (1994): 87-101.
- (36) (with Hyun Song Shin) ‘Representing the knowledge of Turing machines’, *Theory and Decision* **37** (1994): 125-146.  
Reprinted in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gérard-Varet, P. Mongin and H.S. Shin, eds., *Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997: 169-190.
- (37) ‘Never say never’, *Topoi* **13**, 2 (1994): 135-145.
- (38) ‘Definiteness and knowability’, *Southern Journal of Philosophy* **33** (1995, Spindel Conference supplement): 171-191.
- (39) ‘Is knowing a state of mind?’, *Mind* **104**, 415 (1995): 533-565.
- (40) (with Jason Stanley) ‘Quantifiers and context-dependence’, *Analysis* **55**, 4 (1995): 291-295.
- (41) ‘Does assertibility satisfy the S4 axiom?’, *Critica* **27**, 81 (1995): 3-22.
- (42) ‘Wright on the epistemic conception of vagueness’, *Analysis* **56**, 1 (1996): 39-45.
- (43) ‘Admissible rules in modal systems with the Brouwerian axiom’, *Journal of the Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logics* **4**, 2 (1996): 283-303.
- (44) ‘Putnam on the sorites paradox’, *Philosophical Papers* **25**, 1 (1996): 47-56.  
Reprinted in D. Graff and T. Williamson, eds., *Vagueness*, Aldershot: Ashgate / Dartmouth, 2002: 497-506.
- (45) ‘The necessity and determinacy of distinctness’, in S. Lovibond and S. Williams, eds., *Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996: 1-17.
- (46) (with Hyun Song Shin) ‘How much common belief is necessary for a convention?’, *Games and Economic Behavior* **13** (1996): 252-268.  
Earlier version distributed as CARESS Working Paper #92-32, University of Pennsylvania, 1992.  
Reprinted in C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms, eds., *The Logic of Strategy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999: 119-136.
- (47) ‘What makes it a heap?’, *Erkenntnis* **44**, 3 (1996): 327-339.  
Reprinted in D. Graff and T. Williamson, eds., *Vagueness*, Aldershot: Ashgate / Dartmouth, 2002: 239-251.
- (48) ‘Cognitive homelessness’, *The Journal of Philosophy* **93**, 11 (1996): 554-573.
- (49) ‘Self-knowledge and embedded operators’, *Analysis* **56**, 4 (1996): 202-209.

- (50) ‘Knowing and asserting’, *The Philosophical Review* **105**, 4 (1996): 489-523.
- (51) (with Claudio Pizzi), ‘Strong Boethius’ Thesis and consequential implication’, *Journal of Philosophical Logic* **26**, 5 (1997): 569-588.
- (52) ‘Knowledge as evidence’, *Mind* **106**, 424 (1997): 717-741.
- (53) (with Lloyd Humberstone) ‘Inverses for normal modal operators’, *Studia Logica* **59**, 1 (1997): 33-64.
- (54) ‘Imagination, stipulation and vagueness’, in E. Villanueva, ed., *Philosophical Issues 8: Truth*, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1997: 215-228.
- (55) ‘Replies to commentators’, *ibid.*: 255-265.
- (56) ‘The necessity of ignorance’.  
 Extracts translated into Hungarian as ‘A tudatlanság szükségessége’, in B. Petho, ed., *poszt-posztmodern: A Kilencvenes Évek (post-postmodern: The Nineties)*, Budapest: Platon, 1997: 461-463.  
 Full version translated into Spanish by E. Romerales as ‘La necesidad de la ignorancia. Lógica, indeterminación y metafísica’ in A. López Cuenca, ed., *Resistiendo al oleaje: Reflexiones tras un siglo de filosofía analítica*. Madrid: Cuaderno Gris, 1999: 189-201.
- (57) (with Mark Sainsbury), ‘Sorites’, in R. Hale and C.J.G. Wright, eds., *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997: 458-484.
- (58) ‘Conditionalizing on knowledge’, *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* **49**, 1 (1998): 89-121.
- (59) ‘Iterated operators’, in T.J. Smiley, ed., *Philosophical Logic*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, *Proceedings of the British Academy* **95** (1998): 85-133.
- (60) ‘The broadness of the mental: some logical considerations’, *Philosophical Perspectives* **12** (1998): 389-410.
- (61) ‘Bare possibilia’, *Erkenntnis* **48**, 2&3 (1998): 257-273.  
 Reprinted in Serbian translation by M. Andjelković with English summary in *Theoria* (Belgrade) **41**, 4 (1998): 83-99.
- (62) ‘Continuum many maximal consistent normal bimodal logics with inverses’, *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* **39**, 1 (1998): 128-134.
- (63) ‘Indefinite extensibility’, *Grazer Philosophische Studien* **55** (1998): 1-24 and in J. Brandl and P. Sullivan, eds., *New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett*, Amsterdam and Atlanta GA Rodopi, 1999: 1-24.
- (64) ‘Dwa wykłady o wiedzy i przekonaniach’ (‘Two lectures on knowledge and belief’), translated by M. Iwanicki, S. Judycki & T. Szubka, in P. Gutowski and T. Szubka, eds., *Filozofia brytyjska u schyłku XX wieku*, Lublin: TN KUL, 1998: 313-334.

- (65) ‘On the structure of higher-order vagueness’, *Mind* **108**, 429 (1999): 127-143.  
Reprinted in D. Graff and T. Williamson, eds., *Vagueness*, Aldershot: Ashgate / Dartmouth, 2002: 239-251.
- (66) ‘Existence and contingency’, *Aristotelian Society*, sup. vol. **73** (1999): 181-203.  
With printer’s errors corrected, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* **100**, 1 (2000): 117-139.
- (67) ‘A note on satisfaction, truth and the empty domain’, *Analysis* **49**, 1 (1999): 3-8.
- (68) ‘Rational failures of the KK principle’, in C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms, eds., *The Logic of Strategy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999: 101-118.
- (69) ‘Schiffer on the epistemic theory of vagueness’, *Philosophical Perspectives* **13** (1999): 505-517.
- (70) ‘Truthmakers and the converse Barcan formula’, *Dialectica* **53**, 3/4 (1999): 253-270.
- (71) ‘Andjelković on bivalence: a reply’, *Acta Analytica* **14**, 23 (1999): 35-38.
- (72) (with Nicolao Bonini, Dan Osherson and Riccardo Viale), ‘On the psychology of vague predicates’, *Mind and Language* **14**, 4 (1999): 377-393.
- (73) ‘Margins for error: a reply’, *The Philosophical Quarterly* **50**, 198 (2000): 76-81.
- (74) ‘Scepticism and evidence’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **60**, 3 (2000): 613-628.
- (75) ‘Tennant on knowable truth’, *Ratio* **13**, 2 (2000): 99-114.
- (76) ‘Skepticism, semantic externalism and Keith’s Mom’, *Southern Journal of Philosophy* **38** (2000, Spindel Conference supplement on ‘The Role of the Empirical (And of the A Priori) in Epistemology’): 149-158.
- (77) ‘Semantic paradox and semantic change’, in A. Kanamori, ed., *Analytic Philosophy and Logic: Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 6*, Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000: 113-124.
- (78) ‘The necessary framework of objects’, *Topoi* **19**, 2 (2000): 201-208.
- (79) (with Miroslava Andjelković), ‘Truth, falsity and borderline cases’, *Philosophical Topics* **28**, 1 (2000): 211-244.
- (80) ‘Comments on Michael Williams *Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards*’. *Philosophical Studies* **103**, 1 (2001): 25-33.
- (81) (with Jason Stanley), ‘Knowing how’, *The Journal of Philosophy* **98**, 8 (2001): 411-444.  
Reprinted in P. Grim, P. Ludlow and G. Mar, eds., *The Philosopher’s Annual* **26**, Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2002: 237-271.

- (82) ‘Vagueness, indeterminacy and social meaning’, in C. Grant and D. McLaughlin, eds., *Language-Meaning-Social Construction: Interdisciplinary Studies* (Critical Studies, vol. 16), Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001: 61-76.  
Reprinted in P. Hanks, ed., *Lexicology: Critical Concepts in Linguistics*, vol. 1, London: Routledge, 2007.
- (83) ‘Epistemicist models: Comments on Gómez-Torrente and Graff’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **64**, 1 (2002): 143-150.
- (84) ‘Vagueness, identity, and Leibniz’s Law’, in A. Bottani, M. Carrara and P. Giaretta, eds., *Individuals, Essence and Identity: Themes of Analytic Metaphysics* (Topoi Library, vol. 4), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002: 273-303.
- (85) ‘Horgan on vagueness’, *Grazer Philosophische Studien* **63** (2002): 273-285, and in J. Brandl and O. Markič, eds., *Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002: 273-285.
- (86) ‘Necessary existents’, in A. O’Hear, ed., *Logic, Thought and Language* (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 51), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002: 233-251.
- (87) ‘Reply to Machina and Deutsch on vagueness, ignorance, and margins for error’, *Acta Analytica* **17**, 29 (2002): 47-61.
- (88) ‘Understanding and inference’ (in symposium on ‘Blind Reasoning’), *The Aristotelian Society*, sup. vol. **77** (2003): 249-293.
- (89) ‘Vagueness in reality’, in M. Loux and D. Zimmerman, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003: 690-715.
- (90) (with Agustín Rayo), ‘A completeness theorem for unrestricted first-order languages’, in J. C. Beall, ed., *Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003: 331-356.
- (91) ‘Truth and borderline cases’, in K. Korta and J.M. Larrazabal, eds., *Truth, Rationality, Cognition and Music* (Proceedings of ICCS ‘01, Seventh International Colloquium on Cognitive Science, San Sebastian, 2001), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003: 45-67.
- (92) ‘Everything’, *Philosophical Perspectives* **17**, 1 (2003): 415-465.  
Selected for P. Grim, K. Baynes and G. Mar (eds.), *The Philosopher’s Annual* **26** (2003).
- (93) ‘Reply to McGee and McLaughlin’, *Linguistics and Philosophy* **27**, 1 (2004): 113-122.
- (94) ‘Past the linguistic turn?’, in B. Leiter, ed., *The Future for Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004: 106-128.  
To be reprinted in J. E. Ford, ed., *The Ontic Return*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.  
Reprinted in Spanish translation as ‘¿Hemos superado el giro lingüístico?’ by G. Rodríguez Espinosa and M. Ponte Azcárate in D. Pérez Chico and M.

Barroso Ramos, eds., *Pluralidad de la filosofía analítica*, Plaza y Valdes, Madrid/Mexico: CSIC Press Service, 2007: 155-188.

- (95) ‘Philosophical “intuitions” and scepticism about judgement’, *Dialectica* **58**, 1 (2004): 109-153.
- (96) ‘Sosa on abilities, concepts and externalism’, in J. Greco, ed., *Philosophers and Their Critics: Ernest Sosa*, Oxford: Blackwell: 2004: 263-271.
- (97) ‘Some computational constraints in epistemic logic’, in D. Gabbay, S. Rahman, J. M. Torres and J. P. van Bendegem, eds., *Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science* (Cognitive Science Series), Oxford and Paris: Hermes, 2004: 437-456.
- (98) ‘Computational limits and epistemic logic’, in W. Löffler and P. Weingartner, eds., *Knowledge and Belief. Wissen und Glauben* (Proceedings of the 26<sup>th</sup> International Wittgenstein Symposium), Vienna: ÖBV-HPT, 2004: 126-140.
- (99) (with Agustín Rayo), ‘Formal semantics and unrestricted quantification’, in E. Assenza, D. Chiricò and P. Perconti (eds.), *Logic, Ontology and Linguistics/ Logica, Ontologia, Linguistica* (Reti, Saperi, Linguaggi, **1**), Rubbettino: Soveria Mannelli, 2004: 131-147.
- (100) ‘Armchair philosophy, metaphysical modality and counterfactual thinking’ (Presidential Address), *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* **105**, 1 (2005): 1-23.
- (101) (with Michael Fara), ‘Counterparts and actuality’, *Mind* **114**, 453 (2005): 1-30.
- (102) ‘Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge’, *Philosophical Quarterly* **55**, 219 (2005): 213-235.
- (103) ‘Knowledge, context and the agent’s point of view’, in G. Preyer and G. Peter, *Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2005: 91-114.
- (104) (with Claudio Pizzi), ‘Conditional excluded middle in systems of consequential implication’, *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, **34**, 4 (2005): 333-362.
- (105) ‘Knowledge and scepticism’, in F. Jackson and M. Smith, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005: 681-700.
- (106) ‘Probability and the notion of luminosity’, *Bulletin of Life and Death Studies*, **2** (2006): 103-112.  
Japanese translation by A. Iwamoto in *Journal of Death and Life Studies* (Tokyo), **6** (2005): 315-330.
- (107) ‘“Conceptual truth”’. *The Aristotelian Society*, sup. vol. **80** (2006): 1-41.
- (108) ‘Can cognition be factorised into internal and external components?’, in R. Stainton, ed., *Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006: 291-306.

- (109) ‘Stalnaker on the interaction of modality with quantification and identity’, in J. Thomson and A. Byrne, eds., *Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006: 123-147.
- (110) ‘Indicative versus subjunctive conditionals, congruential versus non-hyperintensional contexts’, in E. Sosa and E. Villanueva, eds., *Philosophical Issues, Volume 16: Philosophy of Language*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006: 310-333.
- (111) ‘Absolute identity and absolute generality’, in A. Rayo and G. Uzquiano, eds., *Absolute Generality*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006: 369-389.
- (112) (with Igor Douven), ‘Generalizing the Lottery Paradox’, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, **57**, 4 (2006): 755-779.
- (113) ‘Zaključivanje, referencija i semantika pejorativa’, in Z. Čuljak, ed., *Spoznaja i interpretacija. Radovi međunarodnog simpozija “Cognition and Interpretation”*, Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, 10-11.10.2003, Zagreb: Institut za filozofiju, 2006: 1-23.
- (114) ‘How probable is an infinite sequence of heads?’, *Analysis*, **67**, 3 (2007): 173-180.
- (115) ‘Logical deviance and semantic competence’, *Rivista di Estetica*, **34**, 1 (2007): 121-142.  
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- (116) ‘Concepciones metafísicas de la analiticidad’ (translation by Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas of ‘Metaphysical conceptions of analyticity’), *Dianoia*, **52**, 58 (2007): 3-26.
- (117) ‘Philosophical knowledge and knowledge of counterfactuals’, *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, **74** (2007): 89-123, and in C. Beyer and A. Burri, eds., *Philosophical Knowledge — Its Possibility and Scope*, Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- (118) ‘Knowledge within the margin for error’, *Mind*, **116**, 463 (2007): 723-726.
- (119) ‘On being justified in one’s head’, in M. Timmons, J. Greco and A. Mele, eds., *Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007: 106-122.  
Reprinted in M. Arsenijević and Ž. Lazović, eds., *Explanatory Gap: Essays in Memory of Nikola Grahek*, Belgrade: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, 2009: 163-184.
- (120) ‘Why epistemology can’t be operationalized’, in Q. Smith, ed., *Epistemology: New Essays*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008: 277-300.
- (121) ‘Logic and philosophy in the twenty-first century’, translated into Chinese by Chen Bo, *Journal of Peking University (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition)*, **46**, 1 (2009): 45-54.
- (122) ‘Conditionals and actuality’, *Erkenntnis*, **70**, 2 (2009): 135-150.

- (123) ‘Reference, inference and the semantics of pejoratives’, in J. Almog and P. Leonardi, eds., *The Philosophy of David Kaplan*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009: 137-158.
- (124) ‘The use of pejoratives’, in D. Whiting, ed., *Wittgenstein on Language*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming.
- (125) ‘Tennant’s troubles’, in J. Salerno, ed., *New Essays on the Knowability Paradox*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2009.
- (126) ‘Knowledge of Counterfactuals’, to appear in A. O’Hear, ed., *Epistemology*, supplement to *Philosophy*, **84**, 64, pp. 20, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, to appear.
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